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Rubel: Command of the Sea Redux

COMMAND OF THE SEA REDUX
Robert C. Rubel

M

aritime strategy—the application of a nation’s sea power to achieve its
political ends—can be a complicated, multilayered affair, especially for a
great power such as the United States. American maritime strategy’s complex, and
frankly esoteric, nature is exacerbated by the country’s fragmented, “stovepiped”
military and other governance structures. No single agency has the responsibility,
authority, and perspective both to develop and to execute the country’s maritime
strategy. Thus we observe the clashes between the U.S. Navy and Congress, in
which legislators override both the Navy and the Secretary of Defense, taking
control of naval shipbuilding plans.1 Recently, despite the issuance by the Navy,
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard of the strategy document Advantage at Sea,
Congresswoman Elaine G. Luria (D-VA) felt compelled to write a post calling for
a new maritime strategy of the sort the Navy developed in the 1980s.2
All this reflects confusion about what the nation’s sea power is for and how it
should be structured and applied. In part, the problem is doctrinal and statutory;
the Navy is required to focus on raising, training, and equipping forces. This leads
it to define its key war-fighting concept as sea control, which is a tactical, and
therefore inherently a local, function. A strategic, unifying doctrinal concept is
needed to help reduce the confusion.
Nine years ago, the Naval War College Review
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term in its foreword, but defines it as “the strategic condition of free and open
access and usage of the seas necessary for our nation to flourish.”4 In doing so, it
confuses cause and effect.
Freedom of the seas is a U.S. policy that is enabled by the country’s command
of the sea, which, rightly understood, is a strength relationship among the navies
of those nations that would contend for global leadership. Command of the sea
denotes a concentration of sea power in one nation such that others do not challenge it directly. The United States has enjoyed virtually unchallenged command
of the sea since 1945, but now the combination of a shrunken USN fleet and
China’s aggressive naval buildup is making that command ever more tenuous—
with potentially dire geopolitical consequences. NDP 1 does state correctly that
“[c]ommand of the seas is a fundamental strategic pillar of our nation, necessary
for the security and prosperity of our citizens.”5 Given that, it is critical that the
Navy take full account of the term, including its components and implications—
which it has yet to do. This article will expand further on those matters.
Congresswoman Luria’s July 2021 post calls for the development of a new
maritime strategy. A key reason she wrote the post was her frustration with the
Navy’s budget submission. She feels—as do other members of Congress, apparently—that no valid strategy underpins the Navy’s shipbuilding plan. In a 1974
Naval War College Review article, then–Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner redefined
the missions of the U.S. Navy as strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and naval presence.6 Turner said that an understanding of the rationale for
these missions was essential for formulating strategic plans, allocating resources,
and developing supporting naval tactics. However, his formulation displaced the
concept of command of the sea, which had been a fundamental element of naval
strategy since ancient times. By replacing command of the sea with sea control, the
basis for Navy planning became operational rather than strategic—ignoring the
geopolitical impact of a single world ocean.
So long as the vessels of our fleet were sufficiently numerous and lacked serious competition or threat at sea, this doctrinal shift carried with it no adverse
consequences. However, that congenial set of strategic conditions now is changing, and a return to the earlier term is needed to provide for the functions Turner
mentions: formulating strategic plans, allocating resources, and developing supporting naval tactics. To this array of functions we might add “providing a set of
criteria by which new fleet-design options can be assessed.” If the Navy wants
to develop a new and effective maritime strategy along the lines for which Congresswoman Luria calls, it will need to embrace and understand the implications
of the term command of the sea.
Congresswoman Luria calls on the Navy to develop a new strategy of the
type that focuses on achieving political ends; however, that is, by law, beyond
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/6
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the authority of the service. The Navy is limited to raising, training, and equipping forces for use by the combatant commanders (COCOMs), who do have
the authority to develop such strategies. The problem is that under the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which establishes the command-and-control (C2)
architecture for the U.S. military, the world is divided into six regional areas of
responsibility—a grid that overlays the single world ocean. The UCP does not
provide for an operational-level command that has cognizance over the world’s
largest geographic feature.
However, from time to time strategic problems have arisen that involve the
unity of the world ocean and require that perspective to solve.7 In the 1980s, the
Navy developed the famous Maritime Strategy to rationalize the apportionment
and allocation of naval forces globally in the event of a conventional war with the
Soviet Union. Collectively, the individual war plans of the COCOMs assumed the
availability of twenty-two carrier battle groups (CBGs), but the United States had
only fifteen at the time. Moreover, a global strategic perspective was needed to
avert the maldeployment of naval forces, specifically any denuding of the Pacific
of CBGs to reinforce the European Command, which would leave American territory open to Soviet incursions. A Vice Chief of Naval Operations memo of the
period stated the following: “[T]he obvious conclusion as shown here is that our
current force maritime strategy for a near-simultaneous global war cannot be the
sum of existing CINCs’ [COCOM] plans.”8
Another such strategic problem arose in the wake of the September 11 attacks:
how to secure American coasts from terrorist incursion. In a series of war games
held at the Naval War College in the months after the attack, it became clear that
there were not enough total ships in the Navy and Coast Guard combined to
protect the coasts using a patrol strategy. The ultimate answer was to secure all
the seas via extensive international maritime-security cooperation. The resulting
strategy document was aimed at securing the world ocean, and it was successful
in doing so.9 In both cases it was the Navy—stepping at least partly outside its
Title X constraints—that developed the needed strategies.
In both cases mentioned above, command of the sea was not an issue. In the
1980s, the Navy was large enough to exercise command adequately in all regions,
and the Soviet navy exhibited no desire to sortie out and challenge that command. In 2007, there simply did not exist any navy that remotely could challenge
the U.S. Navy, regardless of its parent nation’s intent. However, in 2022 that condition has changed. China is building a navy that in the not-too-distant future
might be able feasibly to challenge American command of the sea, especially
if the U.S. Navy does not use the concept of command of the sea as a basis for
strategy development. As a practical planning aid, command of the sea would
create a mind-set that is strategic and global (whereas sea control is operational
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022

3

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [2022], No. 2, Art. 6

RU B E L

69

and local), provide relevant criteria for both assessing risk and engaging in fleet
design, help establish a more realistic assessment of the implications of Chinese
and Russian naval developments, and concoct more-compelling arguments for
desired resources. Moreover, it could catalyze creativity in efforts to innovate.
The DNA embedded in our definition of command of the sea is deterrence, involving a naval strength differential sufficient to deter other nations from mounting a direct naval challenge in wartime, and in peacetime causing them to refrain
even from naval building. This definition of command of the sea is supported
by research conducted by George Modelski and William R. Thompson, who
used ship counts to track and analyze the dynamic of geopolitical competition
for global leadership from the late fifteenth to the late twentieth century. They
found that over the course of five “long cycles” of such competition, global war
produced a nation that seized command of the sea, defined as possessing around
50 percent of the total naval forces available to contending nations. When “deconcentration” occurred—when the proportioning of ship counts evened out among
contenders—global war eventually broke out, and the cycle repeated.10 Another
way of saying this is that when it was perceived that challengers had evened the
naval odds, deterrence eroded. Thus, there exists the strategic imperative to
maintain command of the sea through maintaining a sufficient concentration of
sea power. This is nothing more than the instantiation of the old Roman adage
that if you want peace, prepare for war. Along this line, Britain’s Naval Defence
Act of 1889 provided for a Royal Navy that was at least equal to the power of the
next two strongest navies.11 It is important to note that in today’s world, sea power
is one element of many that contribute to the reality and perception of overall
national strength. That said, in the past five centuries the deconcentration of sea
power has been associated, without exception, with the breakout of global war.
Modelski and Thompson also found that one of the benefits of command of
the sea was the ability of its possessor to enforce a global order congenial to its
interests.12 This required the exercise of command: the deployment of the navy
in peacetime to carry out whatever functions the nation needed to support and
defend the world order it desired. “Great maritime nations demand the exercise
of seapower.”13 The United States began deploying the Navy in response to the
Soviet challenge in 1946, when it dispatched the battleship Missouri to support
Turkey in a dispute with the Soviet Union over the Dardanelles. Eventually, it
ringed the Eurasian continent with sea power to deter and respond to aggression by the Soviets and their proxies. This global deployment has been made in
support of the U.S. policy of defending a global liberal trading order. The demise
of the Soviet Union did not alter that policy, and the U.S. Navy has continued to
deploy to “protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance.”14
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/6
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However, as the nation harvested a “peace dividend” after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, reduced defense budgets resulted in a progressively smaller fleet,
even while demand for forward-deployed forces from the regional COCOMs
continued unabated, especially in the wake of the September 11 attacks and the
resulting global war on terror. The Navy attempted to keep up with the demand
by increasing deployment lengths, deferring maintenance, and curtailing some
training, but such shortcuts may have contributed to a series of ship collisions
in the Pacific Fleet.15 A report by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) concluded: “Unfortunately, the benefits provided by a robust
naval presence are also threatening the long-term health of the Navy. The high
OPTEMPO [operational tempo] of the last decade has resulted in deferred maintenance, reduced readiness, and demoralized crews.”16
If the exercise of command is contributing to the deterioration of combat
readiness, and therefore possibly the maintenance of command, we must understand better the relationship between the two. If history is any judge, the
maintenance of command and its exercise are parts of the same fabric of global
leadership and cannot be separated. Thus “balancing” between them does not
make any strategic sense; both are necessary if peace and a favorable world order
are to be preserved. That is the first principle associated with command of the
sea. The second principle also derives from the fused nature of maintenance and
exercise: do not risk maintenance of command while exercising it. These two
principles have powerful implications for the Navy’s fleet design, C2 arrangements, and strategy.
If these principles (which will be expanded on a bit later) are critical to understanding command of the sea and its implications, understanding what constitutes command of the sea in the modern world is even more critical. Throughout
most of the last five centuries, as chronicled by Modelski and Thompson, command of the sea has been a function of numbers of hulls, both as a surrogate indicator of overall national power and will and as an actual measure of naval combat
capability. However, modern technology, especially that involving cyberspace,
may be changing that calculus. Former Navy admiral and two-term congressman
from Pennsylvania Joseph A. Sestak Jr. argues in the Winter 2020/21 Texas National Security Review that equating command with ship count is a self-defeating
formula. Increased ship counts incur huge manning and maintenance costs. His
view is that a capability-based approach that features cyber defense and offense
as a principal factor would lead to a more relevant measure of command.17 He
very well may be right, but more-focused research on the matter is needed to
determine the best calculus.
In this author’s view, having large numbers of missiles that can be expended
liberally, along with a force structure that can be replenished, such that an
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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extended war of exhaustion can be supported, is also important. In any case, extensive research and gaming are needed to nail down a useful new underpinning
for command. That said, the basic definition still holds: a strength superiority
that deters challenge. Given that understanding, we can proceed to tease out the
embedded principles and their implications.
The first principle, which asserts that the maintenance of command and its
exercise are fused inextricably, derives from the reason for command in the first
place: global leadership. This is the gold ring that great powers seek because of its
associated security benefit: a favorable world order. As Thucydides, in his History
of the Peloponnesian War, reports the Athenians saying, “[R]ight, as the world
goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they
can and the weak suffer what they must.”18 Whereas weaker nations must exist in
a world order imposed by the ascendant great power, the great powers engage in
self-help because they can. When the global leader is successful—almost invariably as a result of victory in a global war—it must both dissuade challengers and
use force or the threat thereof to impose its values, or at least to suppress as much
instability as possible in the rest of the world. Throughout history, oceangoing
naval power has been the mechanism whereby global leaders attained global
reach, and therefore influence. Thus, any argument about combat readiness versus forward presence is specious; it ignores the inherent nature of command of
the sea. If a nation does not aspire to global leadership and thus to maintaining a
world order favorable to its interests and values, then command of the sea is irrelevant; if it does, overall strength and global reach and influence are inseparable
components. How a navy does both is the alpha and omega of maritime strategy.
As a matter of policy—and, some might say, grand strategy—the United States
brokered, and subsequently used force to defend, a global liberal trading order
based on institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
The goal was to foster a rules-based international order that not only would promote globe-wide economic development on an equitable basis but also would
reduce the chances of another world war. In the aftermath of World War II, the
U.S. Navy possessed unchallenged command of the sea and was large enough
to deploy superior forces, mostly centered on aircraft carriers, to most locations
where influence of some kind was needed.
The service’s strength consisted of two parts: deployed forces and those in
home waters undergoing maintenance and working up for deployment. Together,
these meant that the U.S. Navy had both initial-response forces and surge forces
available when needed. This was illustrated in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait.
The initial naval response was in the form of two CBGs: the Eisenhower group
that transited the Suez Canal into the Red Sea and the Independence group then
operating in the Gulf of Oman. By the time Operation DESERT STORM was
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/6
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initiated, the Navy had deployed six other CBGs to the region (Eisenhower and
Independence having been relieved), which took six months. This essential posture—the capability for both initial response and surge—has been maintained
throughout the post–World War II era, and in fact a version of it was advanced
in a CSBA report that Congresswoman Luria cited favorably.19 The problem with
this architecture is that ships still can go no faster than thirty knots. In a context
of global influence in modern conditions, speed of response may be critical, so
the long-standing response/surge posture no longer may have the deterrent value
on which command is based.20
Admiral Sestak advocates for a more robust forward posture, not only in the
Pacific but elsewhere, such as in the Mediterranean.21Historically, when the threat
to command was near, as in the case of Great Britain and Germany prior to the
First World War, the maintenance of command was vested in a concentrated
“Home Fleet” of battleships, while the global exercise of command was carried
out by cruisers. To maintain that posture in the face of constrained budgets, First
Sea Lord Admiral John A. “Jacky” Fisher, RN, conceived of a new ship type:
the battle cruiser.22 For the United States, a strong home fleet of the type that
American naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan advocated made sense when the
United States did not aspire to global leadership and the nation’s policy scope
extended only as far as the Monroe Doctrine.23 Once American strategic interests
expanded beyond the Western Hemisphere after World War II, the breadth of
the oceans separating the United States from the rest of the world governed the
U.S. Navy’s architecture. Fleet size was determined on the basis of the number of
ships needed to support rotational deployments.24 In a kind of inversion of the
British formula—in which the requirements of maintenance of command of the
sea drove the number of capital ships, and the forces for its exercise were primarily cruisers and smaller—the needs of exercise of command drove American
fleet size, and its strongest units, the aircraft carriers, were the principal units on
which exercise was based.
But speed of response may drive the United States to a new architecture that
is driven by threat, not by exercise (presence) requirements. If Admiral Sestak is
right, the whole concept of a surge of naval forces across the Pacific in response to
a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the closure of the South China Sea, or some other
form of aggression via the sea may constitute a deterrent no longer, and whenever
that happens command of the sea is lost. Forward basing of a CBG in Guam, as
he suggests, might help.25 However, if, as Sestak claims, cyber capability is the
new coin of the realm (so to speak) in terms of naval power, if offensive missile
quantity matters, and if a distributed flotilla of numerous smaller ships represents
a more robust deterrent than a few aircraft carriers, then a more extensive approach to forward basing will be needed. All this suggests a very different fleet
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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architecture from the Navy’s current one, but one that could be obtained rather
more quickly than the Navy could be enlarged by building more of the service’s
current ship types.26 In other words, maintenance of command and its exercise
would become more integrated, and units would be stationed forward rather than
based in the United States.
The second principle offers a strategic criterion for assessing risk. Modelski
and Thompson showed that a deconcentration of sea power—its more even distribution among those nations vying for global leadership—has been associated
with the eventual outbreak of global war. In other words, deterrence erodes. Although deconcentration of sea power can be a function of naval arms races, there
are other ways for it to occur.
The first way is through losses incurred when exercising command of the
sea. If, for instance, U.S. naval losses in a conflict over Taiwan were great enough
and China’s were sufficiently low, China might be emboldened to undertake
additional aggression via the sea, such as seizing Japanese islands or physically
enforcing its South China Sea territorial claims. Such actions plausibly could lead
to a global war. Even if China did not undertake such aggression, the loss of a
U.S. carrier or two would compromise USN ability to exercise command in other
areas, such as the Middle East, which might embolden Iran or Russia to engage
in aggression. This illustrates that both maintenance and exercise of command of
the sea are intimately connected and inherently global.
The second way command could be lost is through maldeployment of naval
forces. We already have discussed the problem of surge from the United States,
but given that the current U.S. naval posture is based on global strategic dispersion of its forces, the risk arises that when a true naval threat emerges the U.S.
fleet could be defeated in detail. This would suggest that the U.S. Navy should
achieve continuous concentration, at least at key threatened points. Mahan advocated such concentration in the Caribbean to cover the Panama Canal and
enforce the Monroe Doctrine.27 British naval theorist Sir Julian Corbett took a
more flexible view of concentration, one based on the mobility of naval forces; he
asserted that dispersal could form a useful element of concentration if the various
parts could cohere in some way.28 The range of modern missile systems, and perhaps the global reach of the Internet, might offer some wiggle room on physical
concentration. Nonetheless, forces starting from the Middle East would require
many days of transit to reinforce those in either Europe or the western Pacific, so
effective concentration would have to be regional. This is another reason for fleet
architecture to be adjusted to feature forward-based missile flotillas.
Strategic risk associated with the second principle carries with it implications
for the C2 of naval forces. As previously mentioned, the UCP divides the world
into regions in which area-of-responsibility boundaries are drawn in the ocean.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/6
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This inhibits the global maneuverability of naval forces, by requiring an agreement between at least two of the COCOMs that naval forces should be transferred from the control of one to another and by necessitating the establishment
of procedures for communications and doctrinal shifts and the like when ships
cross boundaries. More importantly, the UCP structure does not provide for an
operational maritime staff that has a global perspective, accompanied by the
authority to distribute naval forces strategically. When the fleet was sufficiently
numerous and the threat to American command of the sea low or nonexistent,
this strategic gap in C2 was not relevant, but in an era in which the fleet is much
smaller and China presents a mounting threat to command, it poses a significant
strategic risk. This author and others have proposed elsewhere adjustments to
the UCP to mitigate this risk.29 The logic of centralizing command is in keeping
with U.S. Air Force doctrine, which regards airpower as a scarce resource that
must be managed centrally (via a joint force air component commander) if it is
to be used efficiently. Applying this logic to sea power and scaling it to the global
level are necessary under current geopolitical conditions and current fleet design.
However, if the maintenance and exercise of command of the sea were fused and
invested in strong regional flotillas, the current UCP structure would not constitute such a strategic weakness.
The deterrent effect of American command of the sea still seems to hold, although it may be perilously close to failing.30 In any case, the dissuasion element
has not affected China, whose naval building program has proceeded rapidly
and now includes the construction of an aircraft carrier roughly equivalent to
those of the Nimitz and Ford classes.31 China now makes no secret of its desire to
alter and lead the global order, and to do so it will need a globally capable navy.
Given the American policy of a free and open ocean, it remains to be seen how
the interaction of two world-class navies on a day-to-day basis will unfold—assuming that war does not break out first. The Soviet navy actually outnumbered
the U.S. Navy in certain classes of ships, including submarines, but Soviet naval
doctrine was inherently defensive, so global American command never was
challenged seriously. China’s doctrine, as evidenced by the claim to almost the
whole South China Sea as Chinese territory and the building and militarization
of artificial islands therein, appears to be more expansive. Admiral Sestak claims
that American command of the sea, at least in the western Pacific inside the first
island chain, already is lost, since U.S. ships now can sail there only at Chinese
sufferance.32 As China continues to vie for global leadership and Russia plays
spoiler, the situation at sea will become more volatile.
Decisions about the structure of the U.S. fleet going forward must be informed
by an understanding of how command of the sea might be maintained in the
face of all this. This challenge is far larger than is appreciated currently, and half
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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measures that appear adequate when the organizing concept is sea control might
lead to a catastrophic failure of deterrence. The first step is to determine, through
research and gaming, what elements and factors constitute the modern basis for
command of the sea. Then additional research and gaming will be needed to
develop a strategy for maintaining and exercising it under current and future
conditions. Finally, a compelling case will have to be made, on the basis of that
strategy, to Congress and the American people for making the needed investments. Americans have become accustomed to a globe-girdling liberal trading
order in which goods, services, and finances flow freely and in a generally equitable manner. This order is made possible by American command of the sea; if it
is lost, that order will deteriorate, with incalculable consequences.
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